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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Sri Lanka  
 
 




Sri Lanka‟s agricultural policies since independence in 1948 have reflected changes on 
overall development strategy, as well as the interplay of conflicting domestic political 
considerations, including the need to balance producer and consumer interests, 
government revenue needs, and ethnic and regional factors.  
Sri Lanka was a relatively affluent open agricultural economy at the time of its 
independence from colonial rule in 1948, with one of the highest levels of per capita 
income in Asia, a vibrant democracy, and levels of health, education and other human 
development that rivalled even those of many developed industrial economies. It was an 
oasis of peace, stability and order in a turbulent region (de Silva 1981). Prospects for 
rapid economic development appeared rosy. To many observers it seemed the country 
with the best prospects for development in Asia (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1994). 
However, five decades later it is clear that it has failed to live up to its early promise. It 
remains a low-income economy, having slipped well below the high-performing East 
Asian economies in per capita income terms, and mired in seemingly intractable violent 
ethnic and social conflicts.  
Since independence Sri Lanka has experimented with a wide variety of policy 
regimes, switching from open „non-interventionist‟ free-market policies (up to 1959) to 
dirigiste import-substituting industrialization (ISI) (1960 to 1977) and then to export-
oriented liberalization (after 1977). Although its economic growth performance from the 
late 1970s has been relatively satisfactory in comparison to many similar developing 
countries, its agricultural sector performance – with nearly stagnant per capita 
agricultural output – has been disappointing and has hampered poverty alleviation. Its 
agricultural policies through this period have reflected the changes in the thrust and  
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direction of its broader development strategy. However, there are also elements of 
enduring continuity in agricultural policy throughout this period.
1 
Sri Lanka‟s agricultural sector has two sub-sectors: an import-competing food 
crop sector dominated by rice but also including a range of „subsidiary‟ food crops, and 
an export crop sector dominated by tea (Sri Lanka is the world‟s largest tea exporter) but 
also including rubber, coconut and several minor export crops (cinnamon, spices, etc.).
2 
Fruits and vegetables, livestock and diary are mostly import-competing (and generally 
protected) although small quantities of specific commodities are exported.  
Agricultural policy until well into the 1980s taxed export agriculture while 
providing various forms of input subsidies (irrigation, fertilizer, R&D and extension) to 
protected import-competing food agriculture, particularly rice. The shift to inward-
oriented development strategies from the late 1950s, with protection for import-
substituting industries and accompanying real exchange overvaluation (leading to 
exchange controls and a discriminatory dual exchange rate regime) exacerbated the 
burden on export crops. Despite assistance and protection for import-competing food 
agriculture, the policy regime during this period probably had an overall anti-agricultural 
bias.  
The process of policy liberalization from the late 1970s eroded the former overall 
anti-agricultural bias. Direct taxation of export crops was sharply reduced in the 1980s 
and largely eliminated by the early 1990s, and manufacturing trade liberalization 
drastically lowered the indirect burden on agriculture flowing from industrial 
protectionism. But policy reforms have been both limited and selective in the import-
competing parts of the agricultural sector. Many import-competing agricultural industries, 
including not only rice but also several others such as sugar, potatoes and dairy, have 
continued to enjoy both direct input subsidies and, to varying degrees, protection through 
the trade regime. Thus the overall policy regime – in general far more liberal than at any 
                                                 
1 For reviews of agricultural policy in Sri Lanka, see Thorbecke and Svejnar (1987), Bhalla (1991), World 
Bank (1995), Athukorala and Kelegama (1998), Anderson (2002) and Sanderatne (2004).  
 
2 These „minor export crops‟ are often referred to as „non-traditional‟ agricultural exports, distinguishing 
them from the „traditional exports‟ of tea, rubber and coconut, even though many of these crops have been 




time since the late 1950s – now tends to have a pro-agricutural bias because of the 
reduction in taxes on agricultural exports.  
Protection from import competitions and direct assistance to food agriculture have 
failed to achieve their stated goals of adequately encouraging production of staples and 
reducing the growing gap between rural and urban household incomes. True, domestic 
rice production increased substantially, but overall food production has almost stagnated 
(growing less than half as fast as in other developing countries over the 1990s) such that 
food self-sufficiency has kept declining and rural poverty alleviation has been slow. It is 
clear that a comprehensive re-assessment of agricultural policies should be on the policy 
agenda as a priority issue. 
 
 
Economic growth and structural changes 
 
 
Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has had regular changes in government with 
distinctly different economic policy orientations. As indicated earlier, it has experimented 
with a wide variety of economic policy regimes under different governments. However, 
since 1977 the basic direction of policy has not changed despite several changes of 
government, although there have been differences in the pace and scope of liberalization 
measures. Figure 1 shows real GDP growth rates and the changing policy regimes under 
different governments.
3  
Relatively slow per capita growth during the 1950s and 1960s was followed by 
particularly traumatic experiences during 1970-77, when policy responses to the impact 
of the first oil shock of 1973 and to a youth rebellion resulted in severe import 
compression and shortages of essential goods. This generated widespread popular 
discontent against the ISI policies and extensive government intervention in the economy. 
As a result, there was massive popular support for a shift in policy that brought into 
power a new United National Party (UNP) government in 1977 that pledged to adopt 
                                                 
3 For more details of the policy regimes and growth experience, see Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000), 
Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), World Bank (2004), Weerakoon (2004) and Kelegama (2004).  
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„open economy‟ policies. A major liberalization effort was launched in 1977, marking a 
decisive break with the previous policy regime.  
As a result of progressive pro-market reforms from 1977, Sri Lanka became and 
still is the most open economy in South Asia. Since 1977 it has averaged a reasonably 
healthy real average annual GDP growth rate of 4.75 percent (3.5 percent per capita), 
attaining a per capita income of US$1200 by 2006 at the official exchange rate (and over 
$4,000 in PPP dollars). Despite ongoing ethnic and social conflicts that have plagued the 
country for nearly two decades, this is a higher growth rate than achieved by most 
countries that had similar per capita incomes in the mid-1970s, with only Botswana 
recording faster growth.  
Starting with above average human development indicators across a wide range of 
indicators from its early years of independence (achieved through investments in health 
and education financed by taxes on plantation crop exports), Sri Lanka has managed to 
maintain its position: life expectancy at birth for males and females, for example, 
averages 72 and 76 years – higher than the middle-income country average – and its 
literacy rate is over 90 percent. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka‟s overall developmental 
performance is disappointing when compared with the high-performing East Asian 
economies, given that Sri Lanka had comparable or higher real incomes and human 
capital endowments in the 1950s and early 1960s. This poor performance is at least in 
part due to the ongoing civil war and ethnic conflict that has caused enormous damage to 
the economy and to the wider socio-political environment.
4 
The overall position of agriculture within the national economy is shown in Table 
1. The shares of the agricultural sector in GDP, employment and exports has declined 
progressively from the 1950s, although the sector remains a major source of income and 
employment of a large proportion of the population, and a significant source of national 
export earnings.
5 In contrast to the gradual shrinking of agriculture‟s share of GDP, the 
fall in its share in exports in the 1970s and 1980s has been sharp (Figure 2). Until the late 
                                                 
4 The cost of the war between 1983 and 2000 was conservatively estimated at twice the value of Sri 
Lanka‟s 1996 GDP (Arunatilaka, Jayasuriya and Kelegama 2001).  
5 Note that processing of tea, rubber and coconut products – usually included under manufacturing – is 
included in this table under Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to indicate the overall contribution of the 
sector to the economy.   
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1960s agricultural commodities accounted for more than 90 percent of Sri Lanka‟s 
exports but since the early 1990s its share has been below 20 percent, with manufacturing 
– particularly garments – emerging as the major export category.
6   
The shares of different agricultural products in the value of agricultural 
production and in household consumption expenditure are shown in Figure 3. Paddy 
accounted for around 25 percent of agricultural and fisheries output in the early 1980s, 
but its share is now barely half that. Likewise, the share of rice in household spending has 
halved over that period and currently is around one-tenth.  
The agricultural sector is widely considered to have contributed to the poor 
performance of the wider economy: “In terms of sectoral contributions to growth, 
agriculture has been a continual drag….”, and “the long-term average growth rate in 
agriculture has barely exceeded the rate of population growth, which has contributed to 
the persistence of poverty (the headcount ratio stood at 23 percent in 2002, which is 
relatively high for Sri Lanka‟s per capita income)” (IMF 2005, p. 5).  
Within agriculture, the output of most crops has either stagnated or declined since 
the 1980s (Appendix Table 1). Tea is the sole important exception. Tea output expanded 
from around 200 million kgs per year in the early 1980s to around 300 million kgs at the 
turn of the century. A combination of area expansion (primarily from an expansion of 
smallholder cultivation in the low-altitude regions) and higher-yielding new cultivars was 
stimulated by higher prices for the „stronger‟ teas produced in lower altitudes. Production 
of rice and coconuts – the two crops that dominate smallholder agriculture in Sri Lanka – 
has stagnated, while outputs of rubber, minor crops and subsidiary food crops, including 
income-elastic horticultural crops, have fallen quite significantly. This has meant that 
non-tea agricultural exports have fallen while food imports have grown. Overall, Sri 
Lanka‟s per capita food production has fallen by over 12 percent since 1980, compared 
with a rise of 48 percent in other developing countries on average (World Bank 2001). 
This raises the question: did policy distortions contribute to this relatively poor 
performance? 
 
                                                 
6 Agriculture‟s contribution to net exports is greater than implied by these gross export data because exports 
of garments that dominate manufactured exports have a large import content (Athukorala and Bandara 
1989).   
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Policy evolution  
 
 
At the time of independence, Sri Lanka‟s three plantation crops – tea, rubber and coconut 
– dominated Sri Lanka‟s exports, while significant quantities of rice, wheat and other 
food products were imported. This basic distinction between exportable and import-
competing agricultural products is critical to understanding Sri Lankan agricultural 
policy. Export dependence varies greatly, however. For example, more than 80 percent of 
the coconut crop is domestically consumed, with both nuts and oil being essential parts of 
the Sri Lankan diet. The share of domestic consumption is quite low in the case of tea 
(less than 15 percent) while for rubber it is around 35 percent thanks to an expansion of 
rubber-based manufacturing industries.  
The tea and rubber sectors had a pronounced dualistic structure. Foreign-owned 
large plantations contributed a large share of output at the start of the post-independence 
era, but they were taken over by the state in 1974. Then from the early 1990s they were 
progressively handed back to the private sector, including foreign companies, but the 
share of large plantations has been in gradual decline. By contrast, the import-competing 
food crops as well as the coconuts have always been dominated by smallholders, 
although a substantial proportion of the coconut industry was held in the form of large 
plantations until land reforms in the early 1970s. 
Export taxes on agricultural crops (tea, rubber and coconut products) initially 
were a major source of government revenue, accounting for around 30 percent of all 
government tax revenues during the 1950s. They helped finance expenditures on public 
education and health, and on food subsidies. Levies on exports also financed agricultural 
research, extension and replanting programs for plantation crops. The structure of export 
taxes not only reduced average producer revenues but also had the effect of greatly 
lowering gains from any price increases. When domestic prices rose, whether due to 
world price increases or because of currency devaluations, government tax revenues 
siphoned off the bulk of the price increase. This meant that while producers had to bear 
the cost increases linked to domestic inflation, they were largely deprived of the benefit  
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of any exchange rate adjustments that were made – as happened on several occasions 
from the late 1960s onwards – to restore international competitiveness of tradeables 
sectors.  
In common with many other developing countries, Sri Lanka followed a food self 
sufficiency policy, narrowly interpreted as one of encouraging „rice self sufficiency‟. On 
the production side this involved major investments in irrigation (irrigation water being 
supplied at no cost to farmers), fertilizer subsidies, and the provision of rice and other 
agricultural research and extension services. There was also a public distribution system 
for procurement and marketing of paddy and other commodities, aimed at making rice 
more affordable for consumers. Staple food prices were heavily regulated until the 1977 
liberalization, and many of them have remained subject to strong government 
interventions – including regulation of import volumes – aimed at maintaining price 
stability.  
From the late 1950s, the structure of incentives was further biased against export 
crops with the adoption of import and exchange controls in response to growing balance 
of payments problems caused partly by a secular downward movement of Sri Lanka‟s 
international terms of trade. The adoption of these measures, rather than a currency 
devaluation, led to real exchange rate overvaluation. The import restrictions (tariffs and, 
increasingly, non-tariff measures) and exchange controls were further strengthened 
subsequently as a result of the ideological shift to an ISI development strategy. The result 
was high manufacturing protection, severe import compression, pervasive state controls 
in trade, marketing and distribution, persistent exchange rate overvaluation, exchange 
controls and a formal dual exchange rate system between 1968 and 1977.
7 Under the dual 
exchange rate system, there was a basic rate and a so-called Foreign Exchange 
Entitlement Certificate Scheme (FEECS) which was initially (in 1968) set at 44 percent 
higher (more depreciated) rate, but adjusted to 55 percent in 1969 and then to 65 percent 
in 1972. The main plantation crops (tea, rubber and coconut) – the „traditional exports‟ – 
had to convert export earnings at the less favorable official exchange rate while non-
                                                 
7 See Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994) for a description of these developments. Athukorala and 
Rajapatirana (2000) provide an analysis of the manufacturing sector developments.   
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traditional exports were eligible for the FEECS rate.
8 The highly overvalued official 
exchange rate, rather than the somewhat more realistic FEECS rate, was also applied to 
some imports of the major agricultural products such as rice, wheat and sugar. However, 
such imports were heavily regulated and under direct government control. Hence rice 
producers were still shielded from import competition. And there is other evidence (for 
example, the high premium in black market rates of exchange) that there was substantial 
real exchange overvaluation which discriminated against exportable industries and 
favored import-competing ones, both in agriculture and elsewhere.  
In short, despite the fact that the rice sector was granted special incentives and 
other import-competing agricultural products also gained significant protection from the 
import substitution strategy, studies such as that of Bhalla (1991) conclude that there was 
an overall bias against agriculture because of the severity of the anti-export impact of the 
overvalued currency, the large weight of exports in farm output, and the high protection 
granted to manufacturing. This started to change only from 1977, with the policy shift 
away from the ISI strategy and its replacement with more liberal pro-market policies. 
After the 1977 policy liberalization food subsidies to consumers were sharply 
reduced,
9 and the emphasis on food self-sufficiency was enhanced. Public investments in 
major irrigation systems were expanded, for example. The government implemented a 
huge irrigation-cum-hydropower scheme (the Accelerated Mahaweli Development 
Project) with substantial foreign assistance, and around one-third of all government 
capital expenditure was devoted to this single project for several years from 1979. The 
project was explicitly rationalised as a major step towards achieving rice self sufficiency 
– the coveted national goal – and thereby it appealed to the popular imagination which 
partially blunted the political impact of cuts in food subsidies.
10  
                                                 
8 The large plantation crop sector also suffered much investor uncertainty from the mid-1950s, including 
facing the threat of nationalization before they were finally taken over by the state in the mid-1970s. 
9 In the past the government encouraged substitution in consumption of wheat for rice, to reduce the fiscal 
burden of the consumer rice subsidy. 
10 However, the project was resented by sections of the minority Tamil community: not only was an appeal 
for extending irrigation to the existing Tamil farming areas rejected, but the newly irrigated lands were 
settled largely with members of the majority Sinhalese community. This has been highlighted in numerous 
studies. For example, a study by the OECD Development Assistance Committee pointed out how the 
project exacerbated ethnic tensions: “The conspicuous absence of consideration of the project‟s possible 
negative impact on simmering tensions is striking – considering that it had glaring ethno-political 
implications: (1) there was an ethnic overlay to the geographical areas which would benefit (or not) from  
9 
  The 1977 reforms also reduced manufacturing sector trade protection, and explicit 
export taxes on plantation crops were largely eliminated in the 1980s. There were both 
fiscal pressures and political imperatives driving the reduction of export taxes on 
plantation crops: nationalisation of large foreign-owned plantations had transferred them 
to state ownership from mid-1970s, and the land reforms of the early 1970s had 
broadened their ownership base, largely among Sinhalese smallholders (Moore 1985).  
Trade liberalization was not uniform though: it extended to some import-
competing agriculture, but excluded others. Crops that were widely cultivated in the 
North (e.g. red onion, chillies, grapes) were subject to liberalization while protection for 
other crops (such as potato) were maintained and even increased. 
After the initial economic growth stimulus following the liberalization of 1977 
and the huge public sector investment boom (assisted by a massive flow of foreign aid), 
growth started to slacken even though the economy was cushioned for a while by a tea 
price boom in the early 1980s. Simmering ethnic tensions erupted into a secessionist war 
following anti-Tamil riots in 1983, and social tensions in the south led to a highly 
disruptive rural youth rebellion in the late 1980s. Economic and political conditions 
worsened, and the economy lost steam. In 1990/91, responding an emerging balance of 
                                                                                                                                                   
the project; and (2) the government decision to resettle displaced Sinhalese villagers in traditionally Tamil 
regions. The decision by the Jayawardene government to compress and accelerate the 30-year program into 
six years further exacerbated ethnic tensions. The original version of the programme had included irrigation 
projects in the Tamil-majority Northern Province; but this was removed from the accelerated programme 
with the argument that it would be too expensive and problematic technically” (Bush 1999).
 These facts are 
well known, extensively documented and not contested by any serious scholar of Sri Lanka.  “Since the 
1930s and especially the 1940s resettlement projects have been implemented in Sri Lanka to alleviate the 
growing shortage of land in the south-west, where the population is very largely Sinhalese. Sri Lanka's 
Tamils have opposed these projects because they threaten to change the ethnic majority in the provinces 
concerned to the disadvantage of the Tamils and Muslims. With the Mahaweli project, which has been 
planned since the 1960s and consists of a large number of subsidiary energy generation projects, the 
country's largest scheme was launched, the aim being to use at least 74 percent of the settled area – where 
Tamils previously formed the majority of the population – for Sinhalese. The Sinhalese settlement projects 
became one of the decisive motivating factors in the Tamils' resistance. This is not least evident from the 
many attacks on colonies of new Sinhalese settlers during the civil war.” (Klingebiel, 2001, p. 10). Peebles 
(1990) points out how the scheme was re-designed in a way that excluded the largely Tamil populated 
Northern Province:  “The choice of projects to be developed also reflects the focus on Sinhalese settlement. 
Under the Water Resources Development Plan systems J, K and L and part of system I fell within the 
Northern Province and were to irrigate 232,000 acres by a Northern Central Province canal. None of these 
systems were included in the Accelerated program…” (p.43). See also Moore (1985), Manogaran (1987). 
The World Bank, a major donor, subsequently acknowledged the problems related to this project‟s 
perceived ethnic bias in a World Bank study: “…..donors may have missed a significant opportunity to  
promote equitable participation through the huge Mahaweli power, irrigation and resettlement scheme” 
(Kreimer at al. 1998, p. 22).  
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payments crisis, the government devalued the currency and initiated a second wave of 
liberalization (Dunham and Kelegama 1997).  
Liberalization proceeded in an uneven way following the initial measures. Export 
duties on plantation crops, already reduced substantially from the mid-1980s, were 
eliminated in 1992, while high rates of nominal (and effective) protection for import-
competing agriculture continued (Edwards 1993, World Bank 1995). The government 
frequently used regulatory controls on imports, manipulating licensing and variable 
tariffs, to achieve not only protection but also price stability. The latter was particularly 
important in the case of the highly politically sensitive commodities such as rice and, at 
times, also coconut. Tariffs on agricultural imports were gradually reduced through to 
1993 and, as part of the GATT‟s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Sri Lanka 
bound all its tariffs on agricultural goods at a uniform rate of 50 percent from January 
1995 – although this was well above applied tariffs. Subsequently it removed quantitative 
restrictions on all agricultural imports except wheat and wheat flour. In fact some of the 
most important changes since the early 1990s have been not so much in the level of 
restrictions as in the move away from various forms of nontariff barriers including 
regulatory interventions to more transparent tariff-based import restrictions. The general 
picture, which is confirmed by the various indicators of assistance provided below, is that 
the policy regime in recent years has provided assistance to import-competing agriculture 
and at rates similar to the levels of assistance to manufacturing industry.
11  
The general trend in overall policy – despite phases of slow progress and 
occasional backsliding – has been towards progressive liberalization, and Sri Lanka now 
has perhaps the most open trade regime in South Asia. The evolution of the overall 
structure of incentives can be seen by looking at the changes for the manufacturing sector 
and the two agricultural sub-sectors. At the time of the 1977 reforms, the implicit rates of 
protection for manufacturing as well as many import-competing agricultural commodities 
                                                 
11 Athukorala and Kelegama (1998) suggest that the actual level of protection for manufacturing tended to 
be overestimated by the use of gazetted tariff rates which were often higher than actual tariffs because of 
various tariff loopholes and exemptions. But the same may be true of earlier estimates of effective 
assistance to agriculture. For example, the World Bank (1995) produced estimates that attempted to take 
into account the provision of free or subsidized inputs such as irrigation water used by many import-
competing crops grown under irrigated conditions, including rice. We believe the approach used to derive 
that implicit subsidy associated with free irrigation water tended to overestimate it.  
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were extremely high. Even after major reforms, effective protection of the manufacturing 
sector in 1979 has been estimated to be 137 percent (Cuthbertson and Athukorala 1991). 
This had fallen to 90 percent in 1981, and was estimated to have come down to 77 
percent in 1991 and 43 percent in 1994 (World Bank 2004). By 2005, liberalization in the 
manufacturing sector had proceeded further.  
In addition to reforms in manufacturing, there have been important moves 
towards liberalizing the food import-competing sector. Wheat imports were liberalized by 
ending a government-granted long term monopoly on flour milling to a Singaporean 
based company (PRIMA) that also gave them a virtual monopoly on animal feed supply. 
Government trading enterprises play a role in both domestic distribution and international 
trade, but it is minor.  
Trade policy continues to protect rice and several other import-competing food 
crops (such as potato) with the use of seasonally varying tariffs and specific duties. Those 
interventions respond to domestic price and supply conditions. Further, despite the 
shrinking share of agriculture in both GDP and employment, agricultural producer 
subsidies remain important as governments have responded to intense pressure to 
maintain and even expand them. For example, subsidies such as for fertilizer (targeted 
largely though not solely towards import-competing crops, particularly those cultivated 
by smallholders) continue, in a very volatile political environment. Periodically the 
fertilizer subsidy has been a component of government assistance to agriculture, and 
populist governments have used it to appeal to the politically important farming 
community. Until recently its aggregate assistance effect would have not been large, but 
the fertilizer subsidy doubled in 2006 compared with 2005, and its cost may have risen by 
a further one-third to reach Rs 11 billion ($1200 million) or more in 2007 (Figure 4). 
There are also frequent ad hoc changes to import policies particularly in the case of 
„subsidiary‟ food crops such as potato and onion, where small but politically powerful 
farm groups exercise much political clout.  
Thus the broad contours of present agricultural policies in Sri Lanka appear to 
resemble some aspects of the early agricultural policy evolution in more-developed East 
Asian economies: overall a relatively liberal trade regime, but granting significant 
protection for particular import-competing agricultural industries. In the next section we  
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present the estimates of a number of indicators of incentives for major agricultural 
products and different commodity categories (such as exportable and import-competing 
products). We then attempt to explain the changing pattern of agricultural 




Direct and indirect distortions to incentives 
 
 
The main focus of the present study‟s methodology for estimatingthe extent of distortions 
to agricultural incentives (Anderson et al. 2008) is on government-imposed measures that 
create a gap between actual domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. 
Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with 
a sectoral view alone, the project‟s methodology estimates the effects not only of direct 
agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but 
also of distortions in non-agricultural sectors that compete with farmers for mobile 
resources such as labor and capital.
 More specifically, this study computes Nominal Rates 
of Assistance (NRAs) for farmers and also generates an NRA for nonagricultural 
tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a 
Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 2008).  
We present in Table 2 our estimates of temporal patterns of distortions to 
agricultural incentives from 1955 to 2004 for seven major commodities: three exportables 
(rubber, coconut and tea) and four import-competing products (rice, potato, onion and 
chillies).
12 In Table 3 we also include a guesstimate of the NRA for non-covered farm 
products, which account for around one-third of the overall value of agricultural 
production. That guesstimate assumes non-covered products are equally divided between 
exportables, nontradables and import-competing products (one-third each of the residual 
                                                 
12 Some commodities, such as livestock including dairying, are not included in this exercise because of 
severe data limitations. For the livestock sector, for example, consistent time series data on domestic prices 
of meat products are not available, and international prices for comparable quality meat products are also 
not available. The quality differences between domestic and world market products, except perhaps in the 
case of chicken, are so large as to make them almost completely different products.    
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value of farm production), and that for nontradables the NRA is zero while for 
exportables and importables they are equal to the estimated NRAs for the two sub-sets of 
covered products (all of which are tradable). The farm input assistance was minor before 
2005 and so no estimate is included for such non-product-specific assistance. The NRA 
for non-agricultural tradables is based on the import duty collection rate for import-
competing manufacturing and an assumption that direct assistance to non-agricultural 
exportables is zero.
13 This can substantially underestimate the actual rate of 
manufacturing protection, because high tariffs (or binding non-tariff barriers) may result 
in low rates of import duty collections because they lead to lower import volumes. We 
believe the non-agricultural NRA before liberalization in 1977-78 would be significantly 
higher than indicated by these data, and that the RRAs may therefore correspondingly 
underestimate the policy bias against agriculture. (Annual time-series NRAs and value of 




We begin by focusing on export crops before turning to import-competing ones, and in 
doing so refer to the NRA five-year average estimates in Table 2 and the annual estimates 
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Tea 
The annual NRA estimate for tea, which is based on the ratio of the domestic Colombo 
Auction price and the average fob export price of bulk leaf tea, suggests that this industry 
has been taxed by more than 30 percent  up to the mid-1980s. Since then the estimated 
rate of taxation has declined sharply as export taxes were progressively lowered and 
largely abolished by the early 1990s. The NRA has fluctuated around that trend (see 
Figure 5), primarily because the export tax rate was on a sliding scale such that taxation 
was higher during periods of high international prices. There was a steep increase in taxes 
                                                 
13 These NRAs for tradables include an estimate of the trade tax effect of the overvalued exchange rate. As 
outlined in the methodology, that estimate uses the black market exchange rate premium (see Easterly 
2006) and assumes that only half of exporters‟ foreign exchange rate earnings are sold to the government at 
the official rate. See Anderson et al. (2008) for details of this methodology.  
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in the immediate aftermath of the 1977 reforms, for example, associated with the 
exchange rate depreciation that accompanied the liberalization (which increased the 
domestic currency price on which the tax was based) and the international tea price 
increase of the early 1980s. There is no evidence of significant market imperfections 
within the domestic market for tea production, processing and wholesale marketing 
through the auction. The Colombo Tea Auction is considered to be quite competitive 
though there have been some criticisms of the system in the past. Hence the rate of export 
taxes and cesses provides a reasonable estimate of NRAs given the fact that it is not 
possible to use domestic and border price data to directly compute NRAs  because of  the 
growth of importance of „value added teas‟ (tea bags etc) for which a reliable border price 
is not  available.  
What is not reflected in these figures is that tea imports into Sri Lanka have been 
effectively subject to a near total ban until recently, ostensibly to ensure that cheap 
foreign teas are not re-exported as quality „Ceylon Tea‟. Though there has been some 
relaxation of this recently, a prohibitive tariff  has effectively ensured that tea imports are 
negligible. The outcome has been that Sri Lanka lost the chance to develop a tea blending 
industry, resulting in Dubai emerging as the centre of the lucrative tea blending centre 




The annual NRA for sheet rubber, which is based on the percentage gap between the 
average domestic Colombo Auction price for sheet rubber and the average fob export 
price of rubber, suggests that this industry has been taxed by even more than the tea 
industry, by more than 50 percent up to the early 1980s. Since then the rate of taxation 
has declined fairly rapidly, and reflecting the virtual elimination of export taxes, the NRA 
estimate has averaged clse to zero in recent years. The NRA has fluctuated around this 
trend (see Figure 5), again primarily because the export tax rate was on a sliding scale 
such that taxation was higher during periods of high international prices. As with tea, the 
rate of export taxes and cesses provide a reasonable estimate of NRAs in recent years  
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given that it is difficult to compute reliable NRAs from available price data because of 
the changes in the composition of exported rubbers. 
 
Coconut 
Coconut products (copra, oil, fibre and coir products, etc.) were a major export product 
category at the time of independence, but export volumes have since fallen. Because of 
its importance as a food crop (in the form of nuts) and for coconut oil for household 
consumption (it is the most widely used cooking oil), it attracted significant direct price 
and non-price interventions by the government with the aim of stabilising domestic prices 
while maintaining „reasonable‟ producer prices (de Silva 1979). However, over time 
imported palm oil has emerged as a viable substitute for coconut oil in many domestic 
uses. Thus in more recent years coconut oil may be considered an import-competing 
product. Up to the early 1980s, the NRA estimates suggest the coconut industry was 
taxed to a similar degree to tea (hence less than rubber), but since then its taxation has 
averaged closer to zero and in the late 1990s/early 2000s the industry enjoyed a positive 
NRA. This reflects the fact that imported palm oil has become a viable substitute for 
coconut oil in many uses, and protection from that competition raised the domestic price 
of coconuts above what it would have been without palm oil import restrictions. In the 
case of coconuts, the reductions in export taxes did not produce corresponding reductions 
in NRAs because of trade restrictions on coconuts and coconut products (such as export 
bans) imposed to maintain low consumer prices (and „reasonable‟ producer prices).  
 
Import-competing farm products 
 
Rice 
The pattern of NRAs for rice reflects the fluctuating impacts of direct government 
interventions in response to changes in domestic supplies and international prices. Apart 
from the 1980s, the NRA average each decade has been positive (Table 2), which is  
16 
consistent with the fact that both average consumer and producer domestic rice prices 
have been  usually above the average cif import price.
14  
When domestic prices fall, whether due to a bumper harvest at home or due to a 
fall in the price of imports, pressures for assistance emerge. Rather than increase 
domestic prices by direct purchases, the response to such political pressures from the rice 
farming lobby usually has been to raise import barriers and expand input subsidies for 
fertilizer, R&D, etc. Those ad-hoc policy changes in rice import tariffs since 1995 are 
shown in Appendix Table A3, while the Figure 4 shows  the dramatic increase in the 
fertiliser subsidy in recent years.  
A fuller picture of rice policy requires that it be placed in the context of the wider 
cereal staples policies, particularly for wheat which is the closest substitute for rice in 
consumption even though it is not produced domestically. Rice consumption in Sri Lanka 
averages around 100 kg per capit per year, but wheat consumption has increased with 
urbanization from less than 25 kg during the 1950s to nearly 50 kilogram per capita at 
present. The consumer tax equivalent on wheat flour from import measures was low and 
sometimes even negative until the early 1980s, but then it increased significantly and has 
since fluctuated widely around an average value of more than 50 percent.  
 
Chillies, onions and potatoes  
High rates of import protection were enjoyed by producers of chillies and onions in the 
pre-liberalization protectionist period, but this protection came down after the 
liberalization in 1977/78. In contrast, protection for potatoes increased sharply in the 
post-liberalization period, particularly in the 1990s. Although imports were briefly 
liberalised around 1996, potatoes – grown by only a few thousand farmers – have 
continued to enjoy a pre-eminent position among protected crops.
15  
 
                                                 
14 For those familiar with Sri Lanka‟s history of government subsidized rice provision for consumers, this 
may seem rather puzzling. But those subsidies via ration shops apply only to a small fraction of national 
consumption, such that the weighted average of the (very low) price of government-provided rice rations 
and the open market price consumer price is close to the latter. 
15 Tobacco is another crop that enjoys a high level of protection. According to the WTO Trade Policy 
Review 2004, the average tariff for the tobacco sub-sector was 149 percent in 1998 and 153 percent in 2003 




NRAs are not provided for sugar because it is predominantly imported and domestic 
production is quite small. This is despite the fact that sugar has been heavily protected. 
The level of protection has come down since the 1980s but remains quite high. During 
the period up to the late 1970s when consumer food subsidies were not uncommon, sugar 
was an exception: its high tariff brought in much needed government revenues that 
helped maintain other food subsidy expenditures.  
 
Agricultural versus nonagricultural assistance  
 
The products covered in Table 2 account for about two-thirds of the overall value of 
agricultural production. Their weighted average NRA was around -30 percent in the 
1960s and 1970s, but following the reform of the late 1970s it rose to around -15 
percent in the 1980s, to -2 percent in the first half of the 1990s, and to an average of 
around 10 percent since then. The picture does not change much when our assumptions 
about the NRA for non-covered products are included (top of Table 3), allowing us to 
conclude that the direct taxing of Sri Lanka‟s agricultural sector has been gradually 
phased out over the past three decades. This is not to say the sector is without price 
distortions, as there is still some dispersion in the product NRAs and, in particular, the 
NRA for exportables remains below that for importables. However, both of those 
indicators of dispersion are now well below what they were in earlier decades. This is 
depicted in Figure 6, and is captured also in the trade bias index shown in the middle of 
Table 3. 
   Also important for intersectoral resource allocation is the extent to which non-
agricultural tradables have been assisted by the government. Prior to the 1977 reforms, 
protection for import-competing manufacturing was extremely high. Even taking into 
account the lower assistance to producers of other tradables, the nominal rates of 
assistance to all non-agricultural tradable sectors was well over 100 pecent prior to the 
1970s. By the late 1970s it had fallen to below 60 percent, and since the early 1990s it 
has fallen further and is now les than 25 percent. When these estimates are combined  
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with those for agriculture to generate the relative rate of assistance (RRA), the full 
extent of the discrimination against farmers becomes evident. As shown in the middle 
rows of Table 3, those RRA values suggest that during the 1960s, Sri Lankan farmers 
received only one-third of what they would have received had markets for both farm 
and non-farm goods been free (RRA average of -67 percent). In the 1970s the extent of 
discrimination was not much less (RRA average of -53 percent), but then the average 
RRA continued to fall to around -45 percent in the 1980s, to -25 percent in the 1990s, 
and to just under -10 percent on average in recent years. As is clear from Figure 7, the 
decline in protection to manufacturing did more to reduce distortions harming farmers 
then did the changes in direct agtricultural policies. And the exchange rate distortions 
were not a major contributor to this trend in average NRA and RRA values, but they 
did affect substantially the anti-trade bias of past policies (see bottom rows of Table 3) 
 
 
The political economy of agricultural policies 
 
 
What were the political forces behind the government‟s agricultural policy choices? We 
consider first the export subsector, and then the import-competing subsector.  
 
 Export crops 
 
At the time of independence relatively large scale, foreign owned companies dominated 
tea and, to a lesser extent, rubber sectors. Even the coconut sector, though largely 
smallholder based, still had a significant number of large „estates‟. There was little 
political sympathy for the plantation sector from the left of centre coalitions that ruled the 
country from 1956 to 1965 (with a brief interruption in 1960) and then again from 1970-
77. The foreign plantations were under threat of nationalization from 1956 onwards, and 
finally they were nationalized in the mid-1970s when all large holdings were subjected to 
a land reform. The majority of the workers in the large plantations, who had migrated 
from South India from the mid-19
th century, had been politically marginalized by being  
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disenfranchised by the first post-independence government. And, most importantly 
perhaps, government revenues depended heavily on foreign trade taxes, with export 
duties alone contributing nearly one-third of all government revenues in the first decade 
after independence. With slow economic growth, governments were continually under 
fiscal pressure and had little scope, even if they desired, to reduce the export taxes on 
plantation crops.  
The combination of high taxes, secular falls in real world prices, and the threat of 
nationalization led to a slow but steady decline of the plantation sector, particularly the 
large plantations. The sector became more and more smallholder-based, a process that 
accelerated after the land reforms. The large foreign-owned firms passed into state 
ownership. The 1977 liberalization did not have an immediate positive impact on these 
industries, however. The exchange rate reforms that involved a significant nominal 
devaluation failed to have much of a positive impact on the sector because the structure 
of progressive export taxes – involving a sliding scale of taxes – effectively taxed away 
most of the gains from the devaluation (and periodic relative price improvements).  
The plantation crop sector, and its role within the economy, had changed in quite 
fundamental ways by the mid-1980s. Its share of the national economy had shrunk, and it 
became quite clear that new investment in replantings and factory modernization were 
essential if the decline of the sector was to be arrested. The political tensions that 
emerged in the aftermath of the 1977 liberalization made the government more sensitive 
to the political importance of plantation crop cultivators. The plantation crops were 
cultivated almost entirely in the wetter central, western and southern regions of the 
country, and the cultivators were predominantly from the majority Sinhalese community, 
whose support was critical if the governing political parties were to stay in power. Also, 
export taxes on plantation crops directly reduced revenues of state-owned large 
plantations. These factors combined to erode the economic and political incentives for 





We have seen that government policies towards import-competing crops have not been 
uniform. Further, in the case of key staple food crops, most importantly in the case of 
rice, there has been tension between the twin objectives of producer support and 
maintenance of low consumer prices. As mentioned earlier, the enduring theme that runs 
through Sri Lankan import-competing agricultural policy in the post-independence period 
is this difficult balancing act between producers and consumers in staple food crops. This 
is best illustrated when we examine policies towards the rice sector. 
 
Rice policy 
Rice is the most sensitive political commodity in the country. The immediate post-
independence governments – aided by the proceeds from high commodity prices during 
the Korean War – were able to maintain and even expand the policy of providing cheap 
subsidized rice to consumers through a universal rice ration, which they had inherited 
from the British colonial rulers. It formed a central component of a wider political 
strategy that aimed to undercut the potential threat from a Marxist left with strong roots in 
trade unions. An attempt to reduce the rice subsidy in 1953 brought the country to the 
verge of revolution. Subsequent attempts in this direction almost invariably led to the 
downfall or political humiliation of the government. Subsidized rice distributed through 
the ration system became a symbol of the political power of the powerful left-wing 
parties in Sri Lanka.  
Rice has enormous symbolism and emotive power in Sri Lanka. Rice self 
sufficiency has been a slogan that appealed to deep seated nationalist aspirations, 
particularly among the Sinhalese, whose ancient civilization was based on irrigated rice 
cultivation and who are stirred by the vision – irrespective of its historical veracity – of a 
Golden Age when Sri Lanka was supposedly the granary of the east and exported rice to 
other parts of Asia. At a more mundane level, the landed rice cultivators and politically 
powerful rice millers exert much clout in terms of garnering electoral support for 
particular political parties. In Sri Lanka, the drive to attain rice self sufficiency was not 
simply one of achieving a Green Revolution on existing rice lands. From the 1930s, 
promotion of rice cultivation through land settlement schemes (“Colonisation Schemes”) 
were linked to the restoration of the ancient glory of the Sinhalese in the sparsely  
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populated so-called dry zone of the country which had been the cradle of the ancient 
hydraulic civilization. Restoration of old irrigation systems – already initiated during 
colonial times by the British – and the building of new and grandiose irrigation systems 
were seen as a vehicle for new Sinhalese farmer settlements in those parts of the country 
that had been largely abandoned by previous generations.
16 As Brunton (1992, p. 82) 
pointed out, “the paddy society was almost entirely Sinhalese”. Thus the rice self 
sufficiency drive became associated with the rising Sinhala nationalism of the post-
independence era. 
In addition to free or subsidized provision of irrigation, fertilizer, seeds, research 
and extension, etc. to assist producers, the government also purchased paddy from 
farmers at a guaranteed price through a state trading entity. It distributed varying 
quantities of rice rations to consumers at subsidized prices until the late 1970s, including 
a period (1966-78) when some rationed rice was distributed free. In addition farmers sold 
rice to private buyers who either milled it themselves or sold it to millers who then sold it 
in the „open market‟. In 1972, facing rising international prices and hoping to increase 
domestic supplies at lower prices, the government granted monopoly procurement rights 
to the state-owned Paddy Marketing Board – but the monopoly could not be enforced, 
and was abolished in 1975.
17 The government has regulated international trade and 
                                                 
16 The President and other government leaders were quite explict about the goal of land settlement. For 
example, the Minister responsible for the Mahaweli project, Gamini Dissanayake, wrote that it represented 
“a return of the people to the ancient homeland …in the Rajarata” (Dissanayake 1983, p. 6, cited in 
Tennekoon 1988). Rajarata is the popular name for the area, largely in the North Central province, that was 
the heartland of the ancient Sinhalese kingdoms. Nimal Sanderatne, former Director of Economic Research 
at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, writes:  “Colonization had another political significance in pluralist Sri 
Lanka. It gave the majoity ethnic community the opportunity to resettle Sinhalese in the ancient historical 
capitals and ancient kingdoms and thereby confirm the area as a Sinhalese rather than a Tamil region. The 
land settlement issue has been a most controversial issue and was an underlying cause for the ethnic 
conflict” (Sanderatne 2004, p. 211). Moore (1985, p. 96). adds:  “ ….Dry Zone development has been 
explicitly viewed as a means of increasing the Sinhalese population in the historic heartland of Sinhalese 
civilization….Between 1946 and 1971 the Sinhalese proportion of the population of the five „frontier‟ 
districts – Amparai, Batticaloa, Polonnaruwa, Trincomalee and Anuradhapura – increased from 33 to 51 
percent. The main cause was the migration of Sinhalese settlers to new irrigation schemes.”    
17 These measures included prohibiting of storage and transportation of paddy in bulk, and procurement 
price increases. But with open market prices high and private traders active in procuring rice despite 
restrictions, the state agency was unable to procure expected quantities.  
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supplies to maintain stable consumer prices, and that remains a central goal of food 
policy.
18 
The non-uniform pattern of trade liberalization from 1977 onwards can only be 
understood by recognizing the central political role of rice, both in consumption and in 
production. The reform government of 1977 was led by Mr J.R Jayawardena, a lifelong 
opponent of the left, strongly pro-western in foreign policy, and a man who had tried and 
failed once to dismantle the rice subsidy scheme. This was where the Accelerated 
Mahaweli Development Project played a critical political role. It provided crucial popular 
political support that enabled him to dismantle the rice subsidy scheme and crush the 
traditional political left, while implementing major liberalization measures.  
But the end of the rice subsidy scheme did not mean that domestic rice prices 
were „left to the market‟, whereby rice producers would be exposed to the pressure of 
cheap imports. So post-1977 government policies continued to aim at consumer price 
stabilization around a „reasonable‟ price, while assisting producers through input 
subsidies and import protection. The NRAs in rice also reflects the impact of 
international price and weather-related domestic supply changes. Because non-tariff 
barriers insulate domestic markets from international markets, changes in domestic 
supply change domestic prices and, even in the absence of any change in the policy 
regime, change estimated NRAs. Hence good harvests depress domestic prices and 
generate pressures for assistance and increased protection. 
Sri Lanka‟s signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 1994 did 
not constrain  the government from exercising a high degree of discretion in changing 
tariffs, because applied tariffs were significantly lower than bound tariffs. The 
government has frequently chosen to change import tariffs in response to domestic 
pressures. For example, from 1995 rice imports were subject to a tariff of 35 percent, but 
an import licensing requirement was imposed in July 2000. In July 2001 when the 
domestic rice price increased because of a production shortfall, the government allowed 
the state agency (the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment, CWE) as well as private 
traders to import rice duty free, waiving the 35 percent tariff. Then in January 2002 a 
                                                 
18 For a comprehensive recent discussion of the paddy-rice sector, see Weerahewa (2004). Note that a 
variety of both consumer and producer rice prices have existed, and the wide variety of different rice 
varieties compound the problem of estimating average prices.  
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specific duty of Rs 7 per kg replaced the tariff – but the CWE was allowed to import rice 
at a specific duty of Rs 4 per kg. In March 2002 the licensing requirement was removed 
and the specific duty was raised to Rs. 5 per kg.
19 It was raised further to Rs. 7 in March 
2003, to Rs. 9 in August 2003, and to Rs. 20 in January 2006 (Appendix Table A3).  
These policy gyrations reflect the political power of the large rice producers and 
processors, but also the sensitivity of governments to consumer opposition to increases in 
the price of the main staple food. The policy liberalization in 1977 clearly reduced 
protection from the previous high levels, but they have not trended down since then. Sri 
Lanka is considered a high-cost rice producer at the margin, so the sector would come 
under considerable pressure, particularly in marginal areas, if trade were to be fully 
liberalized.
20 It would be a mistake to assume that the negative rice NRAs observed in 
2003 and 2004, for example, represent a permanent policy shift. The difficult balancing 
act between serving producer and consumer interests will continue. The policy responses 
will be most sensitive to domestic price movements: high domestic prices will tend to 
induce import liberalization, while low domestic prices will tend to induce import 
restrictions and/or input subsidies (constrained of course by fiscal deficit considerations). 
 
Wheat and sugar import policies  
The changes over time in government policies towards wheat have been closely linked to 
rice policies. During the 1950s and 1960s, when the government was providing a 
subsidized rice ration to consumers, a significant proportion of the „ration rice‟ had to be 
imported as domestic procurement was inadequate. The government had an incentive to 
encourage substitution of wheat for rice in consumption to reduce the fiscal burden of the 
rice subsidy, because wheat was relatively cheaper in international markets than rice (and 
some came through US government aid). With the phase-out of the subsidized rice ration 
                                                 
19 This discussion is based on the WTO Trade Policy Review (2004) and IPS (2003). 
20 The extent to which Sri Lanka has any comparative advantage in rice production has been the subject of 
several studies and much debate. See Abeyratna et al. (1990), Shilipi (1995), Rafeek and Samarathunage 
(2000), Kikuchi et al. (2000 and 2001), Weerahewa, Gunatilake and Pitigala (2003), and Thibbotuwawa 
(2004).  
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scheme starting in 1979, incentives changed. Thus from the early 1980s rice was 
implictly protected via tougher restrictions on wheat imports.
21  
Sugar imports were very heavily taxed in the pre-liberalization period. Tax levels 
have come down since 1977, but are still high. The past heavy taxation has a simple 
explanation: almost all sugar was imported as there was little domestic production, and 
import taxes contributed to reducing the fiscal burden imposed by other food subsidies. 
The prevailing domestic price of sugar was accepted by consumers though much higher 
than the international price, and so long as domestic prices were not increased too much, 
there was little political opposition to the maintenance of this implicit protection. The 
continuing high protection of the sugar industry in recent years is not so much for 
government revenue reasons as to honor a government-foreign private enterprise 
agreement signed in the early 1980s.
22  
 
Chillies and onions 
As noted previously, the liberalization of 1977 involved import liberalization that was 
selective and discriminatory. The agricultural sub-sectors chosen for liberalization (and 
continuing protection) had a clear regional dimension, which also overlapped with 
ethnicity. The previous protectionist policies benefited so-called subsidiary food crops 
(chillies, red onions) as well as crops like grapes. This encouraged expansion of these 
                                                 
21 The state monopoly on wheat imports and distribution that prevailed until 2001 (CWE) enabled the 
government to influence domestic grain prices. PRIMA, a Singapore-based company had a monopoly on 
wheat milling from 1980 under a 20-year agreement signed by the government (and extended for a further 
5 years in 2000). CWE supplied wheat to this monopoly miller until 2001 when PRIMA was granted right 
to import wheat. PRIMA also gained a virtual monopoly in the animal feed sector because it could retain 
wheat bran and other milling by-products and had bought out the only viable competitor (a state agency 
that was privatised). During the contract period, PRIMA could import wheat grain and mill-related 
equipment duty-free, and also enjoyed income-tax exemptions. PRIMA‟s monopoly in wheat imports was 
ended in 2006 but is being challenged in courts. The official justification given for the agreement with 
PRIMA is that it helped to attract a wheat miller to Sri Lanka. This has certainly come at a large cost to the 
country. Clearly these special privileges given to a foreign owned entity impose a burden on consumers 
while not offering any benefits either to producers (no wheat is produced in the country) or in the way of 
government revenues. We refrain from speculating on why the government provided these special 
privileges for a large foreign firm with no obvious compensating benefits to the country. For a fuller 
discussion of this, see Athukorala and Kelegama (1998). 
22 That agreement has some quite striking similarities with the government agreement with the PRIMA 
wheat agreement. This agreement has imposed a huge cost on domestic consumers while delivering 
extremely high profits to the subsidiary of a giant US-based sugar producer. As in the case of PRIMA, this 
too was „justified‟ by the government on the grounds that it attracted a foreign investor. Again, there are 
other explanations possible as to why the government entered into this agreement, raising issues of good 
governance, and complicity in rent extraction and rent sharing.  
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crops in particular regions, such as the Jaffna penisula. Jaffna district produced two-thirds 
of the country‟s entire production of red onions. The dependency of farmers in these 
areas on these high-value crops was such that by 1977/78 red onions and chillies 
accounted for around 75 percent of the total area devoted to non-rice (minor food crop) 
cultivation in the Jaffna district.
23 It was also the only dry zone district that was a rice-
deficit region. The 1977 liberalization produced a sharp fall in protection. Despite the 
negative income effects on producers, their opposition to the reform was ineffective. The 
ability of Jaffna farmers to obtain any response to their demands was constrained by the 
“marginality of the Sri Lankan Tamils to the electoral system as a whole” (Moore 1985, 
p. 109).  
Even so, this issue played an important role in Jaffna in the 1982 presidential 
elections. The escalation of the ethnic tensions into a full-scale secessionist war from 
1983 onwards has had devastating effects on the agricultural economy in the northern and 
eastern  provinces. During the past two decades, commercial ties with the rest of the 
country have been massively disrupted. The upshot of these developments has been that 
farmers in the southern regions expanded their production of minor food crops, and this 
has changed the political dynamic in relation to minor crop policies. This is seen most 
clearly in the case of policy towards crops such as potatoes, where a small group of 
producers have been able to exercise much political clout, and consumer resistence to 
high prices could be largely ignored. As seen in Table 2, despite occasional declines, 
protection for potatoes has tended to increase over time (with increases also – although to 
a lesser degree –for crops such as red onions and chillies). From many viewpoints, a 
strong case can be made for removing assistance to potato growing, given its destructive 
environmental impact on the fragile ecosystems of the country‟s most important river 
catchments and repositories of sources of bio-diversity. As Bruton (1992, p. 170) points 
out, “the strong commitment to the Sinalese culture made it dificult to design an 
economic policy that was equally appropriate for both major ethnic groups”; and there 
can be little doubt that the pattern of liberalization in the 1977/78 period is suggestive of 
a strong ethnic bias. However, the near-complete marginalization of Tamil farmers in the 
North and East from mainstream political life, and the collapse of the agricultural 
                                                 
23 Based on data from Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract – 1979.  
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economy of these regions from the mid-1980s due to the secesionist war, has meant that 
the role of ethnicity has diminished in agricultural policy formulation. Tensions between 







Our discussion of the political economy of agricultural policies has pointed out a range of 
factors that have influenced policy formation in agricultural crops. The broad sweep of 
trade liberalization since the late 1970s has not by-passed the agricultural sector. Further 
progress along these lines is likely, as many of the smaller import-competing sectors may 
find it difficult to withstand the pressures for reform and liberalization. But liberalization 
will be difficult in the case of rice, the most politically sensitive industry. The history of 
agricultural policy in Sri Lanka and the experience of other countries in Asia suggest that 
this will remain the strongest bastion of protectionist pressures in the country for some 
time to come. Even in recent times, whenever the rice industry has been stressed by 
falling prices, the government has come under pressure to placate the industry. Almost 
invariably the government has done so, maintaining the historical pattern of special 
treatment for this sector. Arguably the course of future agricultural trade liberalization 
will depend on the extent to which rice producers in Sri Lanka are able to maintain their 
political clout. But as long as rice (and wheat) remain major items in consumption 
baskets, the level of direct price protection will also be constrained by the need to keep an 
eye on consumer interests, particularly when international prices spike upwards as in 
2008. Fiscal pressures will also place a limit to the extent to which governments can 
provide assistance in the form of input subsidies. It will also be interesting to see if 
governments will be able to maintain current levels and forms of protection for livestock, 
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Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate and political episodes and policy regimes,
a Sri Lanka, 1951 to 2005 
a The United National Party (UNP) has been a right of centre party; the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has been a left of centre 
party. Both parties have frequently entered into coalition governments with other parties. The Peoples‟ Alliance (PA) is a SLFP-
dominated coalition. 
Source: Authors‟ compilation  
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Source: Central Bank of  Sri Lanka, Annual Report, Various Issues  
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Figure 3: Shares of covered crops in value of agricultural production at undistored prices, Sri 


































Source: Derived from FAO data and authors‟ spreadsheet 
35 




















































































































Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various issues). 
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Figure 5 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to tea, rubber, coconut and rice, Sri Lanka, 

































































































































































































































Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, importable and all covered agricultural 










































Source: Authors' spreadsheet 
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Figure 7: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural tradable industries, all nonagricultural 


















































are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Table 1: Agriculture‟s share of GDP, employment and exports, Sri Lanka, 1950 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
  1950-51  1960-61  1970-71  1980-81  1990-91  2000-02  2005 
Sectoral shares of GDP 
             
       Agriculture  44.5  34.6  35.1  33.7  26.3  21.9  18.9 
           Plantation Agriculture  26.3  17.8  15.8  13.9  8.1  5.2  4.4 
                  Tea  7.7  6.5  3.2  2.6  2.4  1.4  1.2 
                  Rubber  5.5  2.3  1.8  1.4  0.6  0.4  0.4 
                  Coconut  7.1  4.8  4.0  3.8  2.4  1.4  1.1 
                  Processing of tea, 
                      rubber, coconut
a 
6.5  4.2  6.8  6.1  2.7  2.0  1.7 
           Non-plantation Agriculture  14.6  14.5  16.7  15.0  14.8  12.1  11.5 
                  Paddy  1.5  5.7  7.2  6.1  4.9  3.1  3.0 
                  Other  13.1  8.8  9.4  8.9  9.9  9.0  8.5 
           Forestry  1.9  1.4  1.4  2.0  1.6  1.9  1.7 
           Fishing  1.2  0.9  1.2  2.7  1.8  2.7  1.3 
       Industries  8  9  14  18  23  26  27 
       Services  53  55  51  48  51  52  55 
               
Sectoral shares of exports               
       Agricultural Exports  >90  >90  94.6  61.6  36.3  19.3  18.2 
                  Tea  >50  >50  55.5  35.1  24.9  14.3  12.8 
                  Rubber  >20  >20  22.0  14.7  3.9  0.5  0.7 
                  Coconut  >15  >15  14.5  7.0  3.5  1.7  1.8 
                  Other      3.1  4.8  4.0  2.8  2.9 
       Manufactures  <2  <2  1.7  31.2  56.6  77.1  80.3 
       Unclassified      3.9  2.7  7.1  1.0  1.5 
               
Sectoral shares of employment  1953  1963  1971  1981  1991  2001  2005 
       Agriculture  53  53  50  45  42  33  31 
       Industry  12  12  12  15  20  22  24 
       Services  35  35  38  40  38  45  45 
  
a  Processing of tea, rubber and coconut products is usually included under manufacturing. Here 
it is included under Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in GDP and export shares, but not in 
employment shares. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various issues)  
Table 2: NRAs of covered agricultural products, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004 
(percent, five-year averages) 
 
  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Exportables
a  -22.8  -40.0  -38.6  -41.1  -45.2  -31.1  -21.4  -24.2  -2.0  5.9 
Rubber  -15.8  -51.5  -48.9  -56.2  -59.6  -51.4  -37.7  -21.8  -4.4  -0.2 
Coconut  -28.6  -29.6  -24.9  -32.8  -36.5  -19.6  -5.1  -34.6  -1.3  16.7 
Tea  -22.3  -39.4  -39.1  -36.8  -37.4  -30.4  -25.6  -12.6  -1.5  -1.2 
                     
Importables
a  62.5  11.9  -5.9  9.0  -3.7  -0.6  -2.1  22.4  31.8  12.8 
Rice  62.5  11.9  -5.9  9.0  -7.7  -5.8  0.1  8.6  19.2  3.7 
Potato  -  -  -  -  77.6  43.3  32.6  157.7  124.8  205.8 
Onion  -  -  -  -  -11.6  28.7  -12.6  43.7  79.3  53.4 
Chillies  -  -  -  -  52.6  33.4  6.9  62.1  76.9  67.2 
                     
All covered products
a  -10.3  -29.9  -30.0  -20.3  -31.9  -19.2  -12.6  -1.7  11.5  8.6 
                     
Dispersion of covered 
products
b  44.2  28.7  20.9  31.9  26.2  22.8  22.4  25.0  20.8  12.6 
                     
% coverage (at 
undistorted prices)  66  66  67  65  64  63  67  65  62  64 
 
a 
Weighted averages, with weights based on value of production at undistorted prices.  
b 
Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet   
Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural industries and relative rate of assistance, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 
2004 
(percent) 
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Covered agric.  products
a  -10.3  -29.9  -30.0  -20.3  -31.9  -19.2  -12.6  -1.7  11.5  8.6 
Non-covered agric.  products  13.2  -9.3  -14.8  -10.7  -16.3  -10.6  -7.8  -0.6  9.9  6.2 
All agricultural products
a  -2.4  -23.0  -24.9  -16.9  -26.4  -16.0  -11.1  -1.4  10.9  7.7 
Non-product-specific input 
assistance (NPS)  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  2.4  1.1  0.1  1.3  1.7 
Total agriculture (incl. NPS)
b  -2.4  -22.8  -24.5  -16.3  -25.5  -13.5  -9.9  -1.2  12.2  9.5 
Agricultural trade bias index
c  -0.52  -0.45  -0.35  -0.45  -0.43  -0.31  -0.18  -0.38  -0.25  -0.05 
Tradables                     
NRA, All Agriculture  -2.7  -25.7  -27.6  -18.5  -29.0  -15.4  -11.2  -1.3  14.0  10.8 
NRA, All Non-Agriculture  104.9  124.6  138.4  70.7  52.9  57.1  59.0  47.1  36.4  22.9 
    Relative rate of   
         assistance (RRA)
d  -52.5  -66.6  -68.0  -51.6  -53.5  -46.2  -44.3  -32.9  -16.3  -9.8 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:
d                      
  NRA, all agric. products  -2.4  -12.9  -15.2  -11.0  -19.7  -11.0  -8.0  -0.9  11.7  9.5 
  Agricultural trade bias index  -0.52  -0.21  -0.06  -0.23  -0.23  -0.22  -0.09  -0.34  -0.24  -0.05 
  RRA   -52.5  -61.7  -63.9  -48.0  -49.2  -44.3  -42.9  -32.6  -16.8  -9.8 
 
a
 NRA including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided by total value of primary agriculture 
production at undistorted price, expressed as a percentage. 
c
 Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural 
sector. 
d 
The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAagt )/(100+NRAnonagt)-1], where NRAagt and NRAnonagt are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
Appendix: Key quantity and price data, assumptions and sources for Sri Lanka 
 
Volume of production, exports and imports data for agricultural products 
From various publications of Central Bank of Sri Lanka‟s Annual Report (various issues) and 
Economics and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka (various issues) and FAO. 
 
Farm-gate product prices data 
Data for paddy/rice are from Bhalla (1987) for the period of 1955 to 1986 and data are from the 
data series of producer price of paddy of Central Bank of  Sri Lanka Annual Report (various 
issues) and adjusted following the method of Bhalla (1987). Data for other products are from 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka‟s Annual Report (various issues) and Economics and Social Statistics 
of Sri Lanka (various issues) and FAO. 
 
Wholesale and retail product prices  
From Central Bank of Sri Lanka‟s Annual Report (various issues) and Economics and Social 
Statistics of Sri Lanka (various issues) 
 
Border prices 
Fob and cif prices are directly from Central Bank of Sri Lanka‟s Annual Report (various issues) 
and Economics and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka (various issues) and FAO. 
 
Exchange rates 
Official exchange rates are from Central Bank of Sri Lanka‟s Annual Report (various issues) and 
Economics and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka (various issues) and, for black market premia, from 
Easterly (2006). 
 
Production, consumption, input and trade taxes and subsidies 
These data are from Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s Annual Report (various issues) and 
Economics and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka (various issues) and the Ministry of Plantation 
Industries (various issues).  44 
Appendix Table A1:  Production of major agricultural crops, Sri Lanka, 1948 to 2005 
   









Mn)  Prod(Mn.nuts)  Prod(MT,000)  Prod(MT'000)  Prod(MT'000) Prod(MT'000)  Prod (MT)  Prod (MT)  Prod (MT)  Prod(MT) 
1948  136  96  1765  390.7  na  na          
1949  135  91  1763  482.7  3  14          
1950  139  115  1982  461  4  37          
1951  148  107  2238  459.7  4  39          
1952  144  98  2455  603.9  na  44          
1953  137  100  2288  457.6  na  36          
1954  166  95  2203  649.8  na  0          
1955  172  95  2420  745  8  73          
1956  170  97  2374  561  8  68          
1957  180  99  2108  652  8  75          
1958  187  102  2109  763  21  55          
1959  187  93  2313  760  20  59          
1960  197  99  2183  897  20  62          
1961  206  98  2601  899  21  76   11,000  36,593   3,928 
1962  212  104  2811  1001  17  64   12,000  0   1,148 
1963  220  105  2549  1026  8  87   13,000  29,216   7,271 
1964  219  112  2991  1054  11  59   16,243  27,202   4,721 
1965  228  119  2681  757  23  55   20,231  31,956   2,117 
1966  222  131  2468  954  14  99   19,367  31,888   7,361 
1967  221  144  2416  1145  21  97   28,916  38,425   11,509 
1968  225  149  2601  1346  13  68   24,108  34,922   18,270 
1969  220  151  2440  1374  15  91   19,812  34,581   26,927 
1970  212  160  2410  1616  26  78   32,198  38,218   31,741 
1971  218  142  2610  1396  14  106   30,000  41,613   30,500 
1972  213  140  2963  1312  15  133   31,980  43,679   31,279 
1973  211  155  1935  1312  49  144   40,037  46,011   26,384 
1974  204  132  2031  1602  50  144   44,581  52,798   26,896 45 
1975  214  149  2398  1154  46  160   37,607  55,680   21,924 
1976  197  152  2330  1252  50  171   43,535  58,407   27,876 
1977  209  146  1821  1677  52  181   42,972  61,496   29,102 
1978  199  116  2207  1891  60  182   38,586  58,426   29,098 
1979  206  153  2393  1917  58  173   46,400  67,900   37,900 
1980  191  133  2026  2133  63  225   50,987  66,891   51,121 
1981  210  124  2258  2230  54  231   37,500  59,100   66,000 
1982  188  125  2521  2156  68  247   36,445  67,543   76,893 
1983  179  140  2312  2484  69  313   40,600  95,300   89,800 
1984  208  142  1942  2420  42  219   73,600  36,700  3,249  68,300 
1985  214  138  2958  2661  41  261   98,700  41,700  3,184  89,000 
1986  211  138  3039  2588  25  296   105,784  57,124  3,806  82,482 
1987  213  122  2292  2127  26  299  29  73,501  56,267  2,723  81,042 
1988  227  122  1937  2477  27  329  53  82,700  59,200  4,222  87,500 
1989  207  111  2484  2063  31  299  54  67,900  77,000  5,365  83,500 
1990  233  113  2532  2538  33  307  57  100,000  61,000  15,903  87,200 
1991  241  104  2184  2389  35  258  66  99,507  41,630  14,046  66,737 
1992  179  106  2296  2340  28  254  60  73,919  82,340  27,879  78,562 
1993  232  104  2164  2570  37  342  69  94,700  72,860  22,838  78,180 
1994  242  105  2622  2684  34  293  72  93,014  82,950  34,726  79,385 
1995  246  106  2755  2810  20  232  71  101,485  78,110  29,719  81,657 
1996  258  112  2546  2061  20  305  70  73,611  63,305  19,367  100,755 
1997  277  106  2631  2239  21  257  63  72,231  73,940  29,138  66,484 
1998  280  96  2552  2692  24  207  62  62,470  55,480  17,444  25,900 
1999  284  97  2828  2857  31  259  66  60,030  105,380  62,729  27,170 
2000  306  88  3096  2860  30  248  64  55,860  79,060  36,560  48,410 
2001  295  86  2769  2695  28  226  48  49,040  68,830  31,966  57,680 
2002  310  90  2392  2856  33  241  38  46,350  66,890  31,560  88,710 
2003  303  92  2562  3071  33  244  61  46,190  67,820  32,301  71,740 
2004  308  95  2591  2609     63  40,480  76,970  37,508  81,270 
2005     2515         50,000  80,000  55,552  76,300 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various issues of Annual Report)46 
Appendix Table A2: Composition of imports, Sri Lanka, 1070 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  1970  1980  1990  2000  2004 
Agricultural Imports  46.4  20.6  14.2  11.3  11.2 
           Rice  15.1  2.2  1.2  0.1  0.8 
           Flour  9.7  5.3  1.0  0.0  0.0 
           Wheat & Meslin  1.0  1.6  2.1  1.7  2.3 
           Sugar  6.7  5.7  4.9  1.9  1.4 
           Milk and milk products  2.4  2.5  2.2  1.6  1.5 
           Other  11.5  3.3  2.8  6.05  5.2 
Other Imports   53.6  79.4  85.8  88.7  88.8 
Total   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various issues)  47   



















Jan 1, 1995-Feb 7, 1995  35% or 
Rs7/Kg 
0  55%  0  EX  4.5  65.7% 
Feb 8, 1995- April 1996  35%  0   35%  0  EX  4.5  44.6% 
Apr 15, 1996-Jan 30, 1997   35%  35%  0  0  EX  4.5  7.6% 
Jan 31, 1997-Nov 20, 1997  35%  0  35%  0  EX  4.5  44.6% 
Nov 21, 1997- Jan 31, 1998  35%  35%  0  0  EX  4.5  7.6% 
Feb 1, 1998- Nov 5, 1998    0  35%  0  EX  4.5  44.6% 
Nov 6, 1998-Oct 23, 1999  35%  0   35%  0  EX  5.5  46.3% 
Oct 24, 1999-Dec 31, 1999  35%  25%  10%  0  EX  6.5  20.9% 
Jan 1, 2000-May 10, 2000  35%  0  35%  0  EX  6.5  48.0% 
May 11, 2000-July 16, 2000  35%  0  35%  0  EX  6.5  48.0% 
July 17, 2000-Feb 19, 2001  35%+QR  0  35%+QR  0  EX  6.5  48.0% 
Feb 20, 2001- Mar 31, 2001  35%+QR  0  35%+QR  40  EX  6.5  60.0% 
Apr 01, 2001-Sep 11, 2001  35%+QR  0  35%+QR  40  EX  7.5  61.7% 
Sep 12, 2001 – Nov 21, 2001  35%+QR  0  35%+QR  40  EX  6.5  60.0% 
Nov 22, 2001-Dec 8, 2001  35%+QR  35%  0+QR  40  EX  6.5  8.1% 
Dec 9, 2001-Dec 31,2001  35%+QR  17.5%  17.5%+QR  40  EX  6.5  34.1% 
Jan 1, 2002- Jan 20, 2002  35%+QR  0  35%+QR  40  EX  6.5  60.0% 
Jan 21, 2002- Jul 31, 2002 
CWE was allowed to import 
30,000 MT 
Rs 7/Kg  0  Rs. 7/Kg 
 
0  EX  6.5  55.6% 
August 1, 2002 – Nov 5, 2002  Rs 7/Kg  0  Rs. 7/Kg  0  10    36.6% 
Nov 6, 2002-Mar 4, 2003   Rs 5/Kg  0  Rs. 5/Kg  0  10    27.4% 
Mar 5, 2003-Aug 18, 2003  Rs 7/Kg  0  Rs. 7/Kg  0  10    36.4% 
Aug 19, 2003-Jan 31, 2006  Rs 9/Kg  0  Rs. 9/Kg 
 
0  10    Na 
Jan 31, 2006 todate  Rs 20/Kg  0  Rs: 20/Kg  0  10    Na 
Source: UpadatedTable 4 of Jayanetti and Tilakaratna (2005) using Various Notifications of Sri 
Lanka Customs. 
a. Includes the defense levy, stamp duty & other surcharges 
Figures in brackets are Average Duty Collection Rates.  
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Appendix Table A4: Exchange rates, Sri Lanka, 1960 to 2005 
(Rs./US$) 
Year  Official Exchange Rate  Secondary Market Rate 
1960  4.75  6.8 
1961  4.76  8.1 
1962  4.76  9.6 
1963  4.76  11.3 
1964  4.78  12.6 
1965  4.78  11.5 
1966  4.78  16.2 
1967  5.93  14.1 
1968  5.93  7.9 
1969  5.96  7.7 
1970  5.96  9.8 
1971  5.96  13.4 
1972  6.7  16.6 
1973  7.75  11.0 
1974  6.6  13.9 
1975  7.71  16.9 
1976  8.83  24.3 
1977  15.56  17.7 
1978  15.51  21.2 
1979  15.45  25.0 
1980  18  22.4 
1981  20.55  22.6 
1982  21.32  27.6 
1983  25  36.4 
1984  26.28  36.2 
1985  27.41  32.8 
1986  28.52  31.5 
1987  30.76  33.8 
1988  33.03  54.5 
1989  40  48.3 
1990  40.24  53.1 
1991  42.58  53.5 
1992  46  54.2 
1993  49.56  54.8 
1994  49.98  54.1 
1995  54.05  56.7 
1996  56.71  62.1 
1997  61.29  68.8 
1998  67.78  72.1 
1999  72.12  80.1 
2000  80.06  80.1 
2001  93.16  93.2 
2002  96.73  96.7 
2003  96.74  96.7 
2004  104.61  104.6 
 
Source: Official from Central Bank of Sri Lanka; black market premia from Easterly (2006) 
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Appendix Table A5: Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  (percent) 
   Chillies  Coconut  Onion  Potato  Rice  Rubber  Tea  All covered  
1955  na  -35  na  na  42  -18.0  -23  -14 
1956  na  -24  na  na  51  -3.6  -18  -8 
1957  na  -28  na  na  70  -19.0  -23  -10 
1958  na  -29  na  na  95  -24.9  -25  -9 
1959  na  -28  na  na  54  -13.5  -22  -11 
1960  na  -32  na  na  42  -38.5  -32  -21 
1961  na  -37  na  na  32  -45.6  -35  -26 
1962  na  -23  na  na  -7  -53  -40  -31 
1963  na  -26  na  na  4  -59  -44  -34 
1964  na  -30  na  na  -11  -62  -46  -38 
1965  na  -31  na  na  -16  -59  -43  -38 
1966  na  -18  na  na  -23  -70  -51  -44 
1967  na  -19  na  na  -9  -57  -44  -32 
1968  na  -34  na  na  1  -25  -28  -20 
1969  na  -23  na  na  18  -34  -30  -15 
1970  na  -22  na  na  15  -48  -36  -19 
1971  na  -48  na  na  7  -60  -41  -7 
1972  na  -33  na  na  3  -56  -44  -31 
1973  na  -26  na  na  42  -45  -30  -10 
1974  na  -34  na  na  -22  -72  -33  -35 
1975  na  -30  na  na  -12  -61  -39  -31 
1976  na  -4  na  91  -16  -70  -40  -35 
1977  na  -37  na  23  38  -38  -15  -11 
1978  36  -53  -36  150  -18  -61  -45  -38 
1979  69  -58  13  46  -29  -67  -48  -45 
1980  52  -52  -9  -41  -12  -55  -36  -33 
1981  36  -25  97  164  -4  -53  -35  -18 
1982  48  -9  16  25  -1  -48  -30  -12 
1983  35  1  11  28  -10  -48  -26  -15 
1984  -5  -13  28  40  -2  -54  -25  -17 
1985  22  -14  51  70  8  -30  -30  -7 
1986  0  26  59  80  23  -31  -25  5 
1987  -22  25  -62  -39  7  -30  -21  -8 
1988  30  -21  -87  14  -29  -54  -33  -33 
1989  5  -42  -25  38  -10  -43  -20  -20 
1990  41  -45  -47  67  4  -46  -25  -14 
1991  47  -33  3  178  -1  -40  -28  -8 
1992  32  -34  -42  146  8  -15  -5  -5 
1993  73  -26  68  144  18  -4  -2  9 
1994  118  -35  236  253  14  -4  -2  10 
1995  102  -42  61  177  29  -5  -2  10 
1996  59  -30  86  66  15  -7  -2  0 
1997  74  10  65  83  22  -7  -1  13 
1998  83  35  108  149  6  -3  -1  16 
1999  67  20  78  150  23  0  -2  18 
2000  71  25  65  160  3  0  -1  11 
2001  81  50  78  225  7  0  -2  19 
2002  63  19  37  181  23  0  -1  17 
2003  54  1  34  257  -5  0  -1  2 
2004  na  -10  na  na  -9  -1  -1  -6 
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Appendix Table A5 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
(percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 











competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1955  0  -14  6  -7  -25  42  -8  105  -55 
1956  0  -8  12  -1  -16  51  -1  105  -52 
1957  0  -10  16  -1  -23  70  -2  105  -52 
1958  0  -9  23  2  -26  95  2  105  -50 
1959  0  -11  10  -4  -23  54  -4  104  -53 
1960  0  -21  3  -13  -34  42  -14  103  -58 
1961  0  -26  -2  -18  -38  32  -20  114  -63 
1962  0  -31  -15  -26  -39  -7  -29  130  -69 
1963  0  -34  -13  -27  -44  4  -30  135  -70 
1964  0  -38  -19  -31  -46  -11  -36  142  -73 
1965  0  -38  -20  -32  -43  -16  -36  158  -75 
1966  0  -44  -24  -37  -50  -23  -42  172  -79 
1967  0  -32  -17  -26  -41  -9  -30  165  -74 
1968  0  -20  -10  -17  -30  1  -19  124  -64 
1969  0  -15  -3  -11  -29  18  -12  73  -50 
1970  0  -19  -6  -15  -35  15  -17  77  -53 
1971  0  -7  -14  -9  -48  7  -11  93  -54 
1972  0  -31  -14  -24  -44  3  -28  93  -63 
1973  0  -10  3  -4  -34  42  -5  52  -38 
1974  0  -35  -22  -29  -45  -22  -34  39  -53 
1975  0  -31  -18  -25  -43  -12  -30  43  -51 
1976  0  -35  -20  -29  -45  -13  -33  65  -60 
1977  0  -11  3  -5  -28  37  -7  55  -40 
1978  0  -38  -22  -31  -52  -13  -37  51  -58 
1979  0  -45  -25  -37  -58  -17  -43  51  -62 
1980  0  -33  -19  -26  -48  -8  -32  51  -55 
1981  0  -18  -10  -11  -34  5  -17  56  -47 
1982  0  -12  -7  -8  -25  4  -12  56  -43 
1983  0  -15  -9  -11  -22  -4  -14  56  -45 
1984  0  -17  -9  -13  -26  0  -16  68  -50 
1985  0  -7  -3  -4  -23  15  -7  68  -44 
1986  0  5  4  6  -10  22  5  68  -37 
1987  0  -8  -5  -6  -6  -10  -8  53  -40 
1988  0  -33  -22  -29  -35  -32  -33  53  -56 
1989  0  -20  -13  -17  -33  -5  -20  53  -48 
1990  0  -14  -9  -13  -35  7  -14  45  -41 
1991  0  -8  -6  -7  -32  15  -8  45  -37 
1992  0  -5  -4  -4  -23  12  -5  52  -38 
1993  0  9  7  8  -14  34  10  50  -27 
1994  0  10  9  10  -18  44  11  43  -23 
1995  0  10  9  11  -20  47  11  37  -19 
1996  0  0  4  3  -16  29  2  40  -27 
1997  0  13  12  14  3  32  14  36  -16 
1998  0  16  11  16  13  20  16  35  -14 
1999  0  18  14  18  10  32  19  33  -11 
2000  0  11  8  11  10  14  11  21  -8 
2001  0  19  13  19  17  22  19  23  -3 
2002  0  17  13  17  8  32  17  23  -4 
2003  0  2  2  4  0  6  3  25  -18 
2004  0  -6  -5  -4  -4  -9  -6  22  -23 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  51   





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  52   
Appendix Table A5 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
  Chillies  Coconut  Onion  Potato  Rice  Rubber  Tea  Non-covered  
1955  na  15  na  na  11  12  27  34 
1956  na  16  na  na  9  13  28  34 
1957  na  16  na  na  9  13  27  34 
1958  na  18  na  na  9  12  27  34 
1959  na  21  na  na  10  11  24  34 
1960  na  15  na  na  11  14  26  34 
1961  na  15  na  na  11  12  28  34 
1962  na  12  na  na  15  12  26  34 
1963  na  12  na  na  14  13  27  34 
1964  na  14  na  na  15  13  25  34 
1965  na  16  na  na  12  13  25  34 
1966  na  11  na  na  14  18  23  34 
1967  na  11  na  na  18  13  21  36 
1968  na  20  na  na  21  8  19  32 
1969  na  17  na  na  20  12  18  32 
1970  na  16  na  na  21  13  18  31 
1971  na  5  na  na  48  4  7  36 
1972  na  12  na  na  17  11  22  38 
1973  na  12  na  na  19  13  16  39 
1974  na  14  na  na  31  11  12  33 
1975  na  10  na  na  23  10  15  43 
1976  na  9  na  1  20  17  16  37 
1977  na  21  na  1  16  8  21  33 
1978  2  18  2  0  21  9  16  32 
1979  2  19  1  1  18  14  11  35 
1980  2  19  1  1  18  10  11  37 
1981  2  16  1  1  23  8  12  38 
1982  2  14  1  1  23  7  13  38 
1983  2  12  1  1  21  8  16  38 
1984  3  16  1  1  16  8  20  36 
1985  6  16  1  1  20  7  17  32 
1986  8  11  1  2  21  9  15  34 
1987  6  12  2  4  18  7  15  35 
1988  4  10  7  2  22  9  13  32 
1989  6  13  1  2  23  7  15  34 
1990  5  11  3  1  24  6  18  31 
1991  7  13  1  1  24  5  16  33 
1992  6  18  4  1  24  4  9  34 
1993  5  15  1  1  23  4  13  37 
1994  4  16  1  1  21  6  12  39 
1995  4  15  1  1  21  7  11  40 
1996  4  18  1  1  15  6  14  41 
1997  2  19  1  1  16  5  17  40 
1998  3  16  1  0  20  4  19  38 
1999  3  20  2  0  22  3  16  34 
2000  2  15  1  0  22  3  19  36 
2001  2  14  1  1  21  3  21  37 
2002  2  17  1  1  20  4  19  36 
2003  2  14  1  1  23  5  18  36 
2004  na  16  na  na  22  6  21  36 
 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet 